Hours and lifestyle reality

Sourced honestly: the 2021 Goldman survey, what changed after it, and what current reporting says about 2026

4 min read

The document this module is built around

In February 2021, thirteen first-year Goldman Sachs analysts compiled their own internal working-conditions survey and presented it to management; it leaked publicly in March 2021 and was reported first-hand by CNN, Forbes, and CNBC, each independently confirming the same figures from the same document. [Established] The respondents reported working an average of 105 hours in the week ending February 13, 2021, and 98 hours on average since the start of that January. Self-rated mental health fell from an average of 8.8 out of 10 before starting the job to 2.8 at the time of the survey; self-rated physical health fell from 9.0 to 2.3. All respondents said the hours had damaged their relationships with friends and family. [Established] — confirmed across multiple independently reporting named outlets covering the same leaked primary document.

Two caveats belong on that data point, stated plainly rather than smoothed away: it's a self-selected sample of thirteen respondents at one bank, not a random or representative survey of the industry, and it captures a specific, extraordinarily busy stretch (early 2021, mid-pandemic dealmaking boom) rather than a typical baseline year. [Established] for both caveats — they're acknowledged in the same reporting that surfaced the figures. The reason this course still leads with it rather than a "typical week" estimate: it's the single best-documented data point in this entire space, sourced to an actual internal document rather than to an aggregator's unsourced claim — and every other figure in this module is weaker evidence than that one.

What changed afterward

Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon responded publicly within days, announcing plans to hire additional junior staff and to strengthen enforcement of an existing "Saturday rule" — analysts kept out of the office from 9pm Friday to 9am Sunday except in pre-approved, deal-critical circumstances. [Established] — Solomon's own public statement, reported by CNN and CNBC at the time. Other banks announced comparable measures in the following months: staffing increases, protected-weekend policies, and pay raises specifically framed as compensation for the hours rather than as a substitute for reducing them. [Directional]

What the current reporting says

Later reporting is consistent that these reforms softened the edges of the job without changing its structure: analysts across multiple banks are still commonly reported working 70–80 hours a week in normal periods, materially above almost any other entry-level knowledge-work role, with hours spiking well above that during active live deals regardless of any stated policy. [Directional] — this is a consistent characterization across post-2021 industry reporting and practitioner accounts, not a single new leaked survey with the same evidentiary weight as the 2021 document; treat it as the honest current picture rather than as equally well-established fact.

The underlying reason the reforms only softened rather than fixed the problem, as characterized consistently across this reporting: the hours are driven by live deal deadlines and client demands that don't pause for an internal policy, and a protected-weekend rule that gets waived "when the deal requires it" waives itself most often during exactly the busiest, most demanding stretches an analyst experiences. [Directional]

A specific number worth naming and rejecting

A claim that "85% of new banking analysts leave investment banking within their first two years" circulates in career-advice content on this topic. Tracing it in this research found it repeated without a cited source or stated methodology — no survey, no sample size, no named research body behind it. [Speculative] — flagged specifically, the same way this platform's other courses name and reject a fabricated statistic rather than letting it stand unchallenged. The broader, better-corroborated point the number is gesturing at — that first-two-year attrition in IB is genuinely high, well above a typical entry-level job — is plausible and consistent with the hours data above; the specific 85% figure is not something this research could verify and should not be repeated as fact.

What this means for a candidate deciding whether to do this

The honest picture, stripped of both the "you'll never sleep" horror-story framing and the "it's not that bad, people exaggerate" downplaying: this is a genuinely demanding entry-level job, with hours reported in the 70–80/week range in normal periods and materially higher during live deals, in a culture where an official protected-weekend policy is real but gets overridden during exactly the periods it would matter most. [Directional] That's the reality a "why banking" answer in Module 03 should be built around actually wanting, not the reality a candidate discovers for the first time in week three of the job.

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